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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
UTAH FARM PRODUCTION 
CREDIT ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
COX, JEFFREY J. and ELLIOTT J. 
a co-partnership, ELLIOTT J. 
COX, JEFFREY J. COX, YVONNE 
COX, BLANCHE COX, UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICAN, TRACY-COLLINS BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY, BANK OF 
EPHRAIM 
Defendant-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 7588 
UTAH FARM PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is a dispute over whether the appellant made 
and breached a loan commitment to the repsondents and, if so, the 
damages to the respondents from the breach. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court found that the appellant breached a 
loan commitment to the respondents and that the respondents were 
damaged in the sum of approximately $44,ooo.oo, which amount was 
offset against the judgment entered in favor of the appellant 
(not appealed) and that because of the offset the appellant was 
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not entitled to any attorney 's fees in connection with its 
judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant requests the Court to reverse that portion 
of the judgment that gave respondents an offset and that denied 
appellant 1s claim for attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. That the respondents are indebted to the appellant 
in the sum of $167,995.29, plus eight percent (8%) per annum 
from December 18, 1978, in connection with a promissory note. 
(Findings of Fact 1-2) 
2. That said note was secured by real and personal 
property and respondents agreed to pay a reasonable attorne~~ 
fee if suit was brought to foreclose. (Findings of Fact 14) 
3. That suit to foreclose was brought and a 
reasonable attorney ~ fee is $15,000.00. (Transcript 82) 
4. That the appellant, through one of its loan 
officers, entered into negotiations to loan money to the re-
spondents fo~ 1977, for the respondents turkey growing business, 
in addition to the amount previously loaned as reflected above. 
(Transcript 235, 239) 
5. That the negotiations concerned two loans, one of 
which was to be a seven year loan payable annually and the 
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second of which was to be payable February 6, 1978, more than 
one year after it would have been made. (Transcript 128-130, 
270-271A; Defendants 'Exb. 30, Pg. 12, attached to Steve 
Adamson ~ deposition) 
6. That the loan officer did not have authority to 
authorize the loan the respondents were requesting because of 
the amount. (Transcript 268) 
7. That the loan committee had to authorize the loan 
and no such authorization was ever made. (Transcript 252, 313) 
8. That nothing was done by the appellant to justify 
the respondents in concluding that the loan officer or anyone 
else had apparent authority to authorize the loan. (Transcript 
118, 120) 
9. That no loan was ever made to the respondents for 
1977. (Findings of Fact 21) 
10. That the respondents did not seek any alternate 
source of financing even though they could have received 
financing from the Moroni Feed Company for 1977. (Transcript 
106, 121, 136-138) 
11. That the respondents elected not to attempt to 
remain in the turkey business for 1977 and elected to pursue 
other business ventures. In particular, Jeffrey Cox went to 
work with Moroni Coal Company in April 1977, and received a 
salary that he would not have otherwise received if he had 
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remained in the turkey business. There was a substantial 
increase in profits in the Moroni Coal Company for 1977 and they 
were reinvested in the company. Jeffrey Cox was a 46-47% 
shareholder in Moroni Coal Company when the profits were made 
and his return may have been the reason for the increase in 
profits. In determining respondents' damages, the trial court 
only credited appellant with the salary and not the benefit to 
Mr. Cox's stock and the benefit to the respondents' business. 
(Transcript 139-142; 328-335) 
12. That the respondents' turkey growing operation had 
suffered losses for the four years previous to 1977. (Plain-
tiff's Exh. 31-34 ) 
13. That in negotiating with the respondents for a loan 
for 1977, the appellant projected 900,200 pounds of turkey would 
be processed. No profit was projected for 1977 by either party. 
(Transcript 227, 273-274) 
14. That prior to the time that the respondents 
discontinued their turkey growing operation they took delivery 
of 20,000 poults which were subsequently sold by them to a 
grower who processed 312, 560 pounds from them. (Transcript 106-
107) 
15. That whether the respondents would have actually 
been able to get delivery of the other 40,000 poults would have 
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depended on whether the Board of Directors of the selling 
company decided to accept the purchase order. (Transcript 177) 
The offset was based on the assumption that the respondents 
would have had 60,000 turkeys. (Transcript 328-335) 
16. That the buyer of the 20,000 turkeys from the 
respondents reimbursed the respondents for the turkeys. The 
respondents presented no evidence as to the amount and said 
amount was not deducted from their claimed profits. (Transcript 
107' 328-335) 
17. That some expenses such as gas and fuel (other 
than for brooding), rent and taxes were not deducted from the 
claimed profit. (Defendants '··Exh. 30, page 12; Transcript 328-
335) 
18. That for those growers that sold through the 
Moroni Feed Company the average profit per pound of turkey 
processed was four cents (4¢) and the average dividend was six 
cents (6r/:.) per pound. (Transcript 200, 207) 
19. That the dividend would not be paid until 1982 and 
would depend on the availability of money in Moroni Feed Company 
at that time. (Transcript 210) 
20. That the abilities of growers differ and no 
evidence was introduced to show that the respondents were 
average. (Transcript 209) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
LOST PROFITS ARE NOT RECOVERABLE FOR BREACH OF A LOAN 
AGREEMENT WHERE THE BORROWER FAIL·s TO MITIGATE DAMAGES 
The measure of damages f-or breach of a contract to 
lend money is the difference between the contract interest rate 
and the increased interest rate the borrower is obligated to pay 
in procuring a new loano Restatement, Contracts §343 (1932); 5 
A. Corbin, Contracts §1078, at 446 (1964); 36 A.L.R. 1409 at 
1410-1411; 22 Am Jur 2d §608, Damages. Ordinarily damages for 
breach of a contract to loan money cannot be more than nominal 
because the money may usually be procured elsewhere at the same 
rate. 36 A.L.R. 1409; 22 Am Jur 2d §69, Damages; Bank of New 
Mexico v. Rice, 429 P.2d 368 (N.M. 1967); Investment Service 
Company v. Smither, 556 P.2d 955 (Ore. 1976); Consolidated 
American Life Ins. Co. v. Covington, 297 So. 2d 894 (Miss. 
1974). 
Like all other jurisdictions, the measure of damages 
in Utah for breach of an agreement to loan money is the 
difference, if any, between the contract interest rate and the 
increased interest rate the borrower is obligated to pay in 
procuring a new loan. Cox Corp. v. Dugger, 583 P.2d 96 (Utah 
1978). The measure of damages is set forth in the dissenting 
opinion which, as far as the measure of damages is concerned, 1~ 
in no way inconsistent with the majority opinion. It say as 
follows: 
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"The normal measure of damages for breach of a 
contract to loan money is the difference, if any, 
between the interest rate contemplated in the 
contract, between the parties, and the rate the 
borrower obtained in the alternate loan; plus the 
expense of obtaining the second loan. But where the 
borrower is unable to obtain money elsewhere, and the 
defendant knew of the particular purpose for which 
the money was needed, special damages may be re-
covered, provided they are not speculative or 
remote." (Emphasis added) 
Under the law of this state, special damages are only 
recoverable "where the borrower is unable to obtain money else-
where." This is because general damages (increase in interest 
rate in second loan) are generally the only damages where 
another loan is obtained. 
In the case at bar the respondents seek only special 
damages which would not have arisen if they had obtained an 
alternate loan. As a matter of law, special damages are not 
recoverable because the respondents made absolutely no effort to 
obtain another loan even though they could have received 
financing from the Moroni Feed Company for 1977. (Transcript 
106, 121, 136-138) 
It is the duty of the borrower to mitigate damages by 
attempting to secure the money from other sources. 36 A.L.R. 
1416; 22 Am Jur 2d §69, Damages; Restatement, Contracts §343 
(1932); 5 A. Corbin, Contracts §1078, at 446 (1964); Davis v. 
Small Business Inv. Co. of Houston. 535 SW2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App. 
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1976). No substantial damages may be recovered where it does 
not appear that the money was unavailable elsewhere upon the 
same terms. 36 A.L.R. 1416-1417. Where there is no proof of an 
attempt to get a loan from another source or no reason why such 
an attempt was not made, no cause of action has been proven. 
Davis v. Small Business Inv. Co. of Houston, supra; AMR' 
Enterprises, Inc. v. United Postal Sav. Ass ~' 567 F2d 1277 (5th 
Cir. 1978); Gooden v. Moses Broso, 13 So. 765 (Ala. 1893). It is 
inequitable to require a lender to pay damages that the borrower 
could have avoided. 
Rather than get another loan, Jeffrey Cox went to work 
with the Moroni Coal Company. That resulted in profits to that 
Company and he was a 46-47% shareholder. The profits were 
reinvested in the Company. The appellant was not credited with 
that benefit to the respondents, but only with Cox's salary. 
Even if the appellant was given credit for the profit and even 
if it was not enough to cover all the respondents alleged 
damages, respondents would still not get the difference in 
damages because the mitigation must, as a matter of law, be in 
the form of an attempt to get another loan before special 
damages are recoverable. Furthermore, for all we know, the 
profit to Moroni Coal Company was more than the damages claimed 
by the respondents for the alleged breach of loan agreement. 
(Transcript 139-142) Respondents want the profits from two 
businesses for the same year when they could not have been two 
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places at once, at least not effectively. 
Even the limited credit that the appellant was given 
was incorrectly calculated. Respondent, Jeff Cox, testified 
that he went to work for the Moroni Coal Company in the 
beginning of April, 1977, for the sum of $200.00 per week. 
(Transcript 139, 141) Accordingly, the trial court gave the 
appellant a credit for $7,200.00 representing 36 weeks at 
$200.00 per week. Since Cox worked all but January - March, he 
worked 39 weeks and the amount should have been $8000.00. 
POINT TWO 
THE LOAN OFFICER WHO ALLEGEDLY AUTHORIZED THE LOAN 
HAD NO AUTHORITY 
The appellant's loan officer did not have authority to 
authorize the loan because of the amount. (Transcript 268) The 
loan committee had to authorize the loan and no such 
authorization was ever made. (Transcript 252, 313) Nothing was 
done by the appellant to justify the respondents in concluding 
that the loan officer or anyone else had apparent authority to 
authorize the loan. (Transcript 118-120) An agent has apparent 
authority when the principal has made it appear that the agent 
has authority and not when the agent has made it appear that 
way. Malia v. Giles 114 P.2d 208; (Utah 1941); Bank of Salt Lake 
v. Corporation of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter 
Day Saints, 534 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975). In the case at bar, the 
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respondents' testimony was that their conclusion that the loan 
officer had authority was based solely on his acts and not on 
anything that the appellant did. (Transcript 118-120) One 
dealing with a supposed agent is bound to ascertain his 
capacity. Dohrmann Hotel Supply Company v. Beau Brummel, Inc., 
103 P.2d 650 (Utah 1940). 
In this case the undisputed evidence was that the 
agent had no express or implied authority. It is also 
undisputed that he had no apparent authority because the 
respondents testified that the only conduct that may have given 
the appearance of authority was that of the agent and not of the 
principal. Therefore, even if there was an agreement by the 
loan officer to make a loan, such is invalid and not binding on 
the appellant. There is no evidence to support the trial 
court's finding regarding authority. 
POINT THREE 
THE DAMAGE FOUND IN THIS CASE WAS NOT CONTEMPLATED 
BY THE PARTIES AND IS NOT RECOVERABLE 
Damages recoverable for breach of contract are limited 
to those that are reasonably supposed to have been in the 
contemplation of the parties as the probable result of its 
breach at the time of the contract. Cox Corp. v. Dugger 583 
P.2d 96 (Utah 1978); Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford 
Acc. & Ind. Co., 325 P.2d 906 (Utah 1958). In the case at bar, 
the respondents had suffered losses in the four preceding years. 
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(Transcript 154, 158, 166) At the time that the appellant 
negotiated with the respondents regarding the 1977 loan, neither 
party projected any profit to be made by the respondents for 
that year. (Transcript 273-274) Apparently the parties 
expected the respondents to break even after four years of 
losses, in a step towards profitable years in the future. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, the appellant is not liable to 
the respondents, even if there would have been profits, because 
such were not in the contemplation of the parties at the time of 
the contract as required by law. Even if there was evidence to 
support Finding of Fact No. 21, that appellant decided to suffer 
a loss rather than make the loan, the contemplated loss was 
nominal. 
POINT FOUR 
THE "AGREEMENT" IS VOID UNDER THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
In this state, certain agreements are void unless in 
writing. The Statute of Frauds in this regard is set forth in 
§25-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as follows: 
"In the following cases every agreement shall be 
void unless such agreement, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by 
the party to be charged therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to 
be performed within one year from the making 
thereof." (Emphasis added) 
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In the case at bar the court has determined that the 
appellant breached an oral agreement to loan money to the 
respondents. If there was an agreement, the undisputed terms of 
that agreement would have to be that there were to be two loans 
in January 1977 and that one of the loans was to be payable 
February 1978, and the other loan was to be payable in seven 
yearse (Transcript 127-130, 270-271A) Therefore, by the very 
terms of the agreement that the court has found the appellant 
made, performance was not to be within one year from making 
thereof. Consequently, the agreement is void and unenforceable 
under the Statute of Frauds. 
Alternatively, if there was no agreement as to the 
dates of repayment, the agreement would still be void. This is 
because where no time for repayment of a loan is stipulated, the 
law implies that it is to be repaid immediately or at the time 
selected by the lender. 17 Am Jur 2d §338, Contracts. In that 
event the respondents could not claim any damages for breach of 
a loan agreement because the the responents would not have had 
the right to use the money for the year that it would take to 
make the profit. 36 A.L.R. 1412; Restatement, Contracts §343 
(1932), Comment a. 
POINT FIVE 
LOST PROFITS ARE NOT RECOVERABLE 
The Supreme Court of Utah, citing Jenkins v. Morgan, 
260 P.2d 532 (Utah, 1953), has previously said that "··· damages 
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for anticipated profits are contingent upon so many 
uncertainties that they are speculative and therefore not 
recoverable, ••• " Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 393 P.2d 468 (Utah 
1964). 
POINT SIX 
DAMAGES ARE NOT RECOVERABLE BECAUSE THE RESPONDENTS 
FAILED TO PROVE THEM WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY 
In another opinion concerning the recoverability of 
lost profits and concerning the need for damages to be estab-
lished with reasonable certainty, the Supreme Court of Utah 
said: 
"The basic and general rule is that loss of 
anticipated profits of a business venture in-
volves so many factors of uncertainty that 
ordinarily profits to be realized in the future 
are too speculative to base an award of damages 
thereon. The other side of the coin is that 
damages to a business or enterprise need only 
be proved with sufficient certainty that reason-
able minds might believe from a preponderance 
of the evidence that the damages were actually 
suffered." Howarth v. Ostergard, 515 P.2d 442 
(Utah 1973). -
There are several reasons why the respondents failed 
to prove damages with reasonable certainty as required by law. 
These reasons are: (1) the evidence was that it was not 
reasonably certain whether the respondents could have acquired 
the last 40,000 poults, (2) the uncontroverted evidence was that 
whether the respondents would have recovered a dividend 
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from the Moroni Feed Company would have depended on the 
availability of money in the Moroni Feed Company in 1982 from 
which to pay dividends and no evidence was introduced to show 
that such was reasonably certain and (3) there was no evidence 
to show that the respondents were average turkey growers. 
Therefore, the proof of the respondents has failed because, even 
if the average grower earned a certain amount of profit, the 
evidence is not reasonably certain that these respondents would 
have also earned such a profit. In fact it is totally 
uncertain. 
It is Not Reasonably 
Certain That the Respondents Could Have Acquired 
the Last 40,000 Poults 
It is essential in every claim for lost profits to 
prove that there was an opportunity to realize the profits. 
Dunn, Recovery of Damages for Lost Profits, 146, §1.2 (1978). 
8 
The respondents first failure of proof in this regard was in not 
proving with reasonable certainty that they could have acquired 
the last 40,000 poults. Whether the order for 40,000 poults 
would have been accepted would have been at the option of the 
Board of Directors of the selling company. (Transcript 177) 
This means that the damage award is speculative as to 2/3 of the 
amount since it is only reasonably certain that respondents 
would have had 1/3 of the turkeys to grow and sell. 
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Whether the Respondents Would Have Recovered a Dividend from 
the Moroni Feed Company is Speculative 
The damage award for lost profits was from two 
sources. The first was -the average profit per pound for turkeys 
sold to the Moroni Feed Company and the second was based on the 
dividend that Moroni Feed Company paid to members like the 
respondents. The dividend is speculative and unrecoverable as a 
matter of law because of the fact that it would not be paid 
until 1982 and would be dependent upon money being available in 
the Moroni Feed Company in 1982 from which to pay the dividend. 
(Transcript 210) No evidence was introduced to show that it is 
reasonably certain that the Moroni Feed Company will have the 
money available in 1982. 
Another error the trial court made was in reducing the 
dividend 10% per year to reach a present value amount. That was 
apparently the custom in the community. Appellant is not bound 
by custom but only by what the present value of the dividend 
would actually be. An allowance for future damages must be 
reduced to its present worth. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. 
Co. v. Fox, 359 P.2d 710 (Okl. 1961) Since it was not in this 
case, the damage award is erroneously calculated as well as 
unjustified for the other reasons stated herein. 
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There Was No Evidence to Show That the Respondents 
Were Average Turkey Growers and Would 
Have Earned Such a Profit 
The award to the respondent was made on the assumption 
that since the average member of the Moroni Feed Company made 
certain profits, that the respondents would have realized the 
same profits5 There is nothing in the record to indicate that 
the respondents were average. Not all growers made the same 
profit. The abilities of growers differs. (Transcript 209) 
To introduce evidence of another's experience requires 
proof of the additional fact in the chain of inference that the 
other operator ran its business in a comparable way. Dunn, 
Recovery of Damages For Lost Profits, 146, §5.8 (1978). In the 
case at bar, the respondents rely totally upon evidence of the 
profits of others. There is nothing in the record to prove that 
the respondents business was in any way comparable. On the other 
hand, the only evidence in the record is evidence that the 
respondents lost money in the preceding four years and there is 
nothing in the record to indicate that the other growers also 
lost a similar amount of money in those years. Therefore, the 
only inference that can be drawn from the evidence is that the 
respondents were not comparable. 
In the' case of Mullen v. Brantley, 195 S.E.2d 700 
(Va. 1973), there was a claim for lost profits by the owner of a 
Shakeys Pizza Parlor and he introduced evidence of profits 
.derived at other Shakeys Pizza Parlors and the national average 
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of all such restaurants. The Court said that such evidence did 
not present a reasonable basis upon which to judge with any 
degree of reasonable certainty what the profits would have been 
at the location in question. The same is even more true in the 
case at bar. The average of the other growers is, by itself, no 
basis for an award to these respondents. There was absolutely no 
evidence to even show that the respondents' facility was compar-
able or that they ran their business in a comparable way. 
Lost profits were awarded in the case of Archer-
Daniels-Midland Co. v. Paull, 188 F.Supp. (W.D. Ark. 1960), 
because the plaintiff proved that other businesses in the area 
that were used in comparison had substantially similar facilities 
and were conducting there business in a similar manner. In the 
case of Butler v. Westgate State Bank, 602 P.2d 1276 (Kan. 1979), 
it was held that the operators capability in running his business 
was a factor to be considered in determing whether an award for 
lost profits should be made. In the case at bar the respondents 
have failed to prove comparability in any way and their proof 
therefore fails. 
POINT SEVEN 
TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS REQUIRES 
A HISTORY OF PRIOR BUSINESS SUCCESS 
In this state, as well as other jurisdictions, the 
law is that damages for lost profits are speculative unless 
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there is a successful business history. In the case of Jenkins 
v. Morgan, supra, the Supreme Court of Utah, citing other 
authorities, said: 
"·· • before special damages for loss of profits to 
a general business occasioned by the wrongful acts of 
another may be recovered, it must be made to appear 
that the business had been in successful operation 
for such a period of time as to give it permanency 
and recognition, and that such business was earning 
profit which could be reasonable ascertained and 
approximated." 
In the case at bar, the respondents business had lost 
money for the four previous years. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 31-34) 
Since the respondents did not have a business that had been in 
successful operation, the damages claimed are unrecoverable as a 
matter of law. The past history makes the damages too uncertain. 
POINT EIGHT 
THE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE NET PROFITS 
Even in a case where the plaintiff is entitled to an 
award for lost profits, the award is limited to net profits and 
not gross profits. 22 Am Jur 2d §178, Damages. The burden of 
proof is on the plaintiff to show an amount that represents net 
profits and it is his burden to recognize, prove, and deduct all 
expenses so that the amount claimed represents net profits and 
not gross profits. Dunn, Recovery of Damages for Lost Profits, 
14 6 § 6. 3 ( 19 7 8) • 
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In the case at bar, the respondents failed to meet 
their burden of proof. Certain expenses were not deducted. For 
example, when the respondents discontinued their turkey growing 
operation, they sold the 20,000 turkeys that they had taken 
delivery of but they presented no evidence as to the amount they 
received and it was not deducted from their claimed profit. 
(Transcript_l07, 328-335) 
Another example is in connection with fuel expenses. 
When the parties were negotiating concerning the loan, a budget 
of anticipated expenses was prepared. (Defendants 1 Exb. 30, 
Page 1) Those expenses had to be deducted to arrive at net 
profits. One of the expenses on the projected budget was for 
"gas and fuel, including brooding." Only the brooding expense 
was taken into account and not the gas and fuel for the trucks, 
etc. (Transcript 108-111) The appellant was not given credit for 
that portion of that expense. Therefore, the respondents have 
failed to meet their burden of proof because not all expenses 
have been deducted. 
Other expenses such as real estate taxes and real 
estate payment for the property used in raising the turkeys, 
were not deducted. Admittedly, these are fixed expenses, that 
the respondents would have had whether they remained in the 
business or not. Nevertheless, they are expenses that would 
have reduced net profit. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-20-
There was also a projected expense for $500.00 for 
rent that was not deducted. (Transcript 111) 
Interest expense is another expense that is incorrect. 
The trial court gave the appellant credit for $9,000.00, which 
the court said represents the amount of interest that the 
respondents would have paid on the loan if they had received it. 
When respondents filled out a "Request for Contract of Guarantee" 
they projected interest in the amount of $25,000.00. (Defendants' 
Exb. 30, Page 10) That amount is more realistic. Respondents' 
testimony was that the amount to be borrowed was $368,100.00. 
(Transcript 124-125 ) No evidence was introduced to show the 
interest rate but even if it had only been ten percent (10%) per 
year, that would have been $36,810.00 in interest for the year 
and yet the appellant was only credited with $9,000.00. Even if 
partial payments had been made during the year to reduce the 
interest, no evidence was introduced to show the likelihood of 
those payments or the amounts, therefore, the reduction is not 
justified. 
POINT NINE . 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED 
After damages for lost profits in the amount of 
$40,927.60 were awarded, an additional amount of $4,000.00, re-
presenting prejudgment interest, was added into the award. This 
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was improper because (1) prejudgment interest is not recoverable 
on an unliquidated claim and (2) there was no evidence from 
which the sum of $4,ooo.oo could have been calculated. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that prejudgment 
interest is no allowable where damages are are unliquidated. 
Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315 (Utah 1977). 
The rationale behind this rule of law is very logical. 
The party that is indebted in an unknown and unliquidated amount 
cannot pay that amount until it is determined and, therefore, 
should not be charged with prejudgment interest until 
it is determined. In the case at bar, this is even more true 
because the respondents claimed the sum of $627,000.00 in their 
counterclaim. Perhaps it would have been different if 
respondents had made demand for the amount the court found they 
were entitled to. 
There is further.error in the rate of interest awarded. 
From the ruling it cannot be determined how the amount of 
$4,ooo.oo was calculated but it would appear that the court took 
the sum of $40,927.60, representing the offset, and added ten 
percent (10%) for interest and rounded off to $4,000.00. 
Apparently, this was on the theory that the appellant was 
charging the respondent with interest at ten percent (10%) per 
annum and if the respondents had an offset, then they would have 
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saved interest if they had been credited with it at the time that 
it was due. (Transcript 332) The fallacy in that thinking is 
that it was never legally a credit during the time that it was 
unliquidated. Furthermore, it is totally independent from the 
indebtedness due from the respondents to the appellant on the 
notes. The second fallacy is in the fact that the note from the 
respondents to the appellant, under which the appellant was 
awarded judgment, only called for interest at the rate of 8.01 
percent per annum with an adjustment possibility. (Plaintiff's 
Exb. 18) However, no evidence was introduced to show that the 
amount was increased. Therefore, the prejudgment interest was not 
only improper as a matter of law, because it was unliquidated, 
but was erroneously calculated because ten percent (10%) per 
annum was not within the evidence. The trial court had no right 
to estimate an amount. 
POINT TEN 
ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISALLOWED 
The undisputed testimony at the trial was that a 
reasonably attorney's fee for the appellant is the sum of 
$15,000eOO. Attorney's fees were denied because the respondents 
succeeded on a portion of their counterclaim. The decision and 
the rationale behind the decision are illogical and against the 
law. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-23-
Where the holder of a note containing a provision for 
the payment of attorney's fees brings an action on the note and 
the plaintiff's recovery is lessened, but not completely 
extinguished by the defendant's recovery on a counterclaim, the 
allowance for attorney's fees should be proportionately reduced 
based on the difference between the amount due on the note and 
the defendants 'recovery on the counterclaim. Morgan v. 
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 106 So 136 (Ala. 192~; Pioneer 
Constructors v. Symes, 267 P.2d 740 (Ariz 1954); Bon Giovanni v. 
Fickett, 10 P.2d 539 (Cal. 1932); State Trust & Sav. Bank v. 
Hermosa Land and Cattle Co., 240 P. 469 (N.M. 1925); Meadow 
Valley Land & Invest Co. v. Manerud, 159 P. 559 (Ore. 1916); 
Tompkins v. Galveston Street R. Co., 23 s.w. 25 (Tex. 1892); Ward 
v. Boydston, 134 s.w. 786 (Tex. 1911); Ware v. Paxton, 266 s.w. 
2d 218 (Tex. 1954). 
The approach taken in those cases is reasonable and 
logical. If the rationale is followed that any counterclaim that 
is successful to any degree precludes attorney's fees entirely, 
then some absurd results would follow. For example, suppose 
defendant was liable on a note for $1,000,000.00 and said 
defendant had a counterclaim for $100.00 or suppose defendant was 
awarded $1.00 in nominal damages. Certainly in that event the 
counterclaimant 's recovery should not preclude attorney~ fees. 
Logically, it should be reduced proportionately. In this case, 
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the counterclaim reduced the judgment by twenty-seven percent 
(27%). Reducing the attorney's fees proportionately would leave 
an award for attorney's fees in the amount of $10,988.50. 
Of course, appellant contends that the counterclaim 
should be dismissed and that therefore, attorney's fees need not 
be reduced .. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the speculative nature of damage claims for 
lost profits, this Court has been reluctant to make any award 
except where it is proven with reasonable certainty. In the case 
at bar it cannot be said that the claim has been proven with 
reasonable certainty. In fact, there are many uncertainties. 
There are at least five major independent reasons why 
the counterclaim should be dismissed. If the law is found to be 
in favor of the appellant in connection with any one of these, 
then the counterclaim must be dismissed as a matter of law. They 
are as follows: 
1. The respondents failed to mitigate damages by 
failing to make _any attempt to get an alternate source of 
financing. Under the case of Cox Corp. v. Dugger, supra, the 
special damages claimed by the respondents must be denied for 
failure to attempt to mitigate. The respondents discontinued 
their turkey operation and had a very successful year in the 
Moroni Coal Company and they want the profit from both ventures 
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even though they could not have been in both places at the same 
time. 
2. The loan officer had no express, implied or 
apparent authority to make any loan. The evidence is undisputed. 
3. Damages for lost profits must have been within the 
contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract. Since 
they were not contemplated by either party the counterclaim must 
be dismissed. 
4. Any agreement that by its terms is not to be per-
formed within one year is void unless in writing under the 
Statute of Frauds. The agreement that the trial court found that 
the appellant made was an agreement to make a loan that by its 
terms would not have been payable within a year. Therefore, 
since it was not in writing, it is void and unenforceable. 
5. The respondents failed to prove that they were 
average turkey growers or that_ they ran their business in a way 
that was comparable to the other growers or that their facility 
was in any way comparable. Therefore, there is a crucial missing 
link in the chain of evidence. In other words, there is no 
connection between the fact that other growers earned a certain 
profit and that therefore the respondents would have earned such 
a profit. 
6. There was no prior history of successful operation. 
Again, as a matter of law, this makes the damage award too 
speculative. 
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There were several other errors in the trial. Although 
these only reduce the counterclaim, the counterclaim would still 
be entirely dismissed if any of the errors stated above are found 
in favor of the appeilant. These additional errors are: 
1. An $800.00 error in calculating the salary to Jeff 
Cox for the time that he went to work for Moroni Coal Company. 
This additional amount should have been credited to the appellant. 
2. Since it is not reasonably certain that the 
respondents could have taken delivery of the last 40,000 poults, 
two-thirds (2/3) of the counterclaim award is speculative. 
3. Since it is speculative as to whether the dividend 
will be available in 1982, the sum of $28,940.40, representing 
the dividend portion of the counterclaim award, is speculative. 
4. Since not all of the expenses were deducted from 
the claimed profits, the amount of the counterclaim is incorrect 
and this would require its dismissal entirely because the 
respondents have failed to meet their burden of proof. 
5. The award must be reduced $4,000.00 because 
prejudgment interest is improper because prejudgment interest 
cannot be awarded on an unliquidated amount and because there was 
no evidence to support the amount calculated by the trial court. 
As a matter of law the counterclaim should be dismissed 
and appellant should be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee. 
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Even if the counterclaim were allowed, at best for the 
respondents, the attorney's fee would only be proportionately 
reduced under the law. 
In summary there are too many reasons against allowing 
the counterclaim and offset to remain. There would be nothing 
inequitable about denying the counterclaim and precluding the 
respondents from obtaining money that they never had and money 
that it is not reasonably certain that they could have had. In 
fact, it appears most uncertain. 
z~ Dated this __ .__,_._day of May, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
\ 
L)'-L.; ~'--l c . 
David B. Boyce 
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